CHAMPION v. GORDON.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
JOHN B. CHAMPION v. ALONZO GORDON.
A paper writing worded thus :-" Philadelphia, November 22d 1869. TL,
Commonwealth National Bank pay to H. Yerkes or order, one hundred anu ift_
(December 3d 1869) dollars. John B. Champion :"-stamped as a b 11 o;
ex ,hange, and negotiated in the market before maturity ; held to be a check, and
not entitled to days of grace.
WRIT of error to the District Court for the city and county of
Philadelphia.
Action of assumpsit. The plaintiff offered in evidence a paper
as described in the syllabus, with a certificate of protest made on
December 3d 1869. The defendant objected, on the ground that
the paper was an inland bill of exchange, and had not been presented for payment at maturity, but had been prematurely protested. The court reserved the question, whether the paper was
entitled to grace; and subject thereto, the jury found a verdict
for the plaintiff. The court in bane gave judgment on the verdict,
and the defendant sued out a writ of error.

Wiltbank and Carpenter,for plaintiff in error.-Whilst checks
differ from inland bills in certain particulars, the paper offered in
evidence did not so differ, and hence was not a check, but a bill;
by the spirit of his engagement defendant was drawer and drawee,
and ,an instrument so made has been adjudged to be an inland bill:
9 Porter, Ala. 76; 2 Mete. 58; such a bill isin Pennsylvania
entitled to grace; the facts, that the paper was payable in the
future, "wasstamped as a bill and negotiated in the market, favor
this view ; the question of a6ceptance or non-acceptance was not
pertinent to the inquiry, and all mercantile paper in Pennsylvania
should be comprised in two classes,-paper payable at sight, without grace, under the Act of 1857, and paper payable in the future,
with grace, as at common law.
Patton, for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHARSWOOD, J.-The law merchant recognises clearly a dis
tinction in many respects between checks in banks and ordinary
bills of exchange. One difference is, that when the former are
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payable on demand or at sight no days of grace are allowed. The
same rule holds when they are post-dated: Byles on Bills 14,
note; 3 Kent's Com. 104, note: In re Brown, 2 Story's Reports
502; Danielsv. Kyle, 1 Kelly 304; Mohawk Bank v. Broderick,
10 Wend. 405; Salter v. Burt, 20 Wend. 205; Andrew v.
Blackly, 11 Ohio (N. S.) 89; Westminster Bank v. Wheaton, 4
Rhode Island 30. Whether it applies also to checks payable at a
future day named, is a question upon which there is a contrariety
of opinion and decision. Mr. Justice STOR says: "The argument
pressed is that checks are always and properly payable on demand, and that when payable at a future time, they become to all
intents and purposes inland bills of exchange. But I am not, by
any means, prepared to admit the validity or force of this distinction ; and no case has been cited which in my judgment satisfactorily establishes it. A check is not less a check, because it is
post-dated and thereby becomes in effect payable at a future and
different time from that on which it is drawn or issued. This is
sufficiently apparent from the case of Allen v. Reeves, 1 East
435." That was the determination of a question arising under
the Stamp Acts, and it was there held that a post-dated check was
not a draft payable on demand but at a future day, and therefore
liable to the duty. Judge STORY adds: "It (a check) is usually
also made payable on demand; although I am not aware that this
is an essential requisite. The distinguishing characteristics of
checks, as contradistinguished from bills of exchange, are (as it
seems to me) that they are always drawn on a bank or banker;
that they are payable immediately on presentment, without the
allowance of any days of grace, and that they are never presentable for mere acceptance, but only for payment :" 2 Story's Rep.
512. He quotes Chancellor KENT as concurring in these views:
3 Kent 104, n.
The ordinary commercial form of a bill of exchange payable at
a future day is at so many days' or months' notice after date or
sight. An order so drawn, whether upon a banker or any other
person, ought to be regarded as a bill with all the privileges and
liabilities which by the law merchant are incident to a bill. The
drawer by adopting this usual form must be held so to intend. So'
if an order be drawn on a merchant or other person not a banker,
with whom the drawer keeps money on deposit subject to draft,
payable at a future day named, there exists no reason why the
same rule should not apply. But there is a good reason why there

8

CHAAIPION v. GORDON.

should be a difference between an order so drawn upon a banker,
-which certainly must be presumed to he by a person who keeps
money on deposit with such banker, subject to draft, and an order
on a merchant oxother person. If such an order drawn upon a
bank payable at a future day named in it, must be considered as
an inland bill of exchange, and not a check, then the payer or
holder has the fight to present it at once for acceptance, protest
it for non-acceptance, and sue immediately the drawer. Should
it be accepted, however, the funds of the drawer in the bank would
necessarily be thereby tied up, until the day of payment. All the
objects of directing payment at a future day would thus be frustrated. What the drawer undertakes is, that on a day named he
will have the amount of the check to his credit in the bank. In
the mean time, he wants the full and free use of his entire deposit.
It is not denied that a post-dated check cannot be presented for
acceptance. That is by implication payable on a future day.
Why then is a check expressly so made payable to stand on different ground? In the ease before us an ordinary printed form of a
bank check was evidently used, and the day of presentment written
in one of the blanks. This is the most convenient form, for it
calls the attention of the cashier or paying teller to the fact, which
he would be likely to overlook, if it were expressed only by the
date. Nothing, I am told, is more common than such mistakes in
the payment of post-dated checks, and depositors often thus find
their account overdrawn, very much to their embarrassment. If
we determine that an order like that before us is not presentable
for acceptance before maturity, we settle the question. It is a
check and not a bill of exchange. More than twenty years ago,
the banks of Philadelphia, under the advice of their counsel,
adopted this rule, and it has been their uniform practice ever
since. The usage of the banks in the commercial metropolis of
the state, ought to have great weight in determining a question of
this character. It is perhaps quite as important that such usage
should not be disturbed, as that the point should be decided abstractly or theoretically right. It was so held in 1866, in the
District Court of Philadelphia, in Lawson v. .ichard , 6 Phila.
Rep. 179, a case in 'which the most eminent counsel at the bar
was concerned for the defendant, and that determination was
acquiesced in.
Judgment affirmed.
'

I. In Pennsylvania the only statute is the Act of May 21st 1857, which progermane to the subject of this decision vides that I All drafts and bills of ex-
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change drawn at sight. shall be and
become due and payable on presentation,
without grace, and shall and may, if
dishonored, be protested on and immediately after such presentation."
In
that state negotiable mercantile paper,
exclusive of one species soon to be noted,
not within the scope of this act-, becomes payable three days after the lapse
of the time named therein for its maturity. Drafts and bills of exchange,
therefore, not drawn at sight, are there,
in the language of merchants, entitled
to grace.
The question in the principal case,
then, was simply this, Was the paper
discussed a draft or bill of exchange not
drawn at sight ?-in the solution of
which it appears that two classes of tests
were applied; one, of scientific and
technical principles; the other, of considerations of intent,--the special intendment of the parties in interest, and
the general intendment of the customs
and usage of commerce. Independently
of the uncertainty how far with propriety a practice, or custom, which has
not been established by a jury, or a finding in equity, may be assumed to exist
by a court of last resort, the authorities
countenance this mode of settling the
difficulty as in most instances the only
wise and just mode. "In my judgment," said STORY, J., "itisfarbetter
that the doctrines of commercial jurisprudence should, from time to time,
adapt themselves to the common usages
and practices and understanding of
merchants, and vary with the varying
courses of business, so as at once to
subserve public convenience, and to
mould themselves into the common
habits of social life, than to assume any
artificial forms, or to regulate, by any
inflexible standard, the whole operations
of trade and commerce :" In re Brown,
2 Story 502. In that case he announced, as the lex et norma by which
to expound a contract evidenced simply
bj a paper decided to be a check, the

"usage of oanks,"--the " understanding of parties to a check,"-and "the
constant habit of business :" Andrew et
al.v. Blachly et al., 11 Ohio, N. S. 95.
Tassel v. Lewis, Ld. Raym. 743. It
cannot be denied, however, that the
principle has very limited application,
and does not cover cases of local custom or usage, being based rather upon
the universal characteristics, and necessary effect, of the several kinds of mercantile paper, than upon any modification of their natural characteristics and
effect by the conduct of those who deal
in them. Such modification, when set
up,.must be proved as matter of fact;
aid must be shown to be within the
rules by which valid customs are tested :
fBowen et al. v. Newell ef at., 5 Saudf.
326; s.c. 2 Duer 585; 4 Seld. 190,
3 Kernan 290; or it must be made a
part of the case, by the agreement of
the parties: Morrison v. Bailey, 5 Ohio
N. S. 13. In the case before us, probably the principle is carried as far as
it may be with safety.
II. The establishment of a distinction
between checks and inland bills of exchange seems to have been necessary to
the decision of the principal case, and
of those which support it; whilst, on
the other hand, that distinction is denied by the authorities to which the
principal case is opposed. In this, it
was held specially. that Champion's order upon the bank was not a bill of exchange at all; and generally, that a
check, though not drawn at sight, was
not only not within the statutory provision above quoted, but beyond the
principle by which bills not within that
statutory provision were entitled to grace.
No matter when datea, payable, expressly, only upon the lapse of time,
though issued befoie maturity, and ne-.
gotiated in the community, checks in
Pennsylvania are not so entitled ; and
this, not because they make an exception to the rule of the common law of
that state, concerning hills, but because
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technically, checks and bills differ radically in their character, and therule has
nothing to do with the former. When
payable at sight they are not within the
Act of 1857. Hence we find them constituting that species of mercantile paper
mentioned at the opening of this note as
unaffected by a principle which applies
to all other negotiable mercantile paper
upon which the statute does not operate:
Lawson v. Richards, 6 Phila. R. 179;
Eank v. Wheaton, 4 R. I. 31 ; In re
Brown, 2 Story 502 ; contrb, Morrison
v. Bailey, 5 Ohio, N. S. 13 ; Brown v.
Lusk, 4 Yerger 210; Bradley v. Delaplaine, 5 Harrington 305 ; Bowen v.
Newell, 4 Seld. 190; (Bowen v. Newell
was subsequently decided by the light
of a general custom proved on a third
trial : vide 3 Kernan 290 ; Bradley v.
Delaplaine was adjudged at Nisi Prius,
but has been followed since.)
III. The preliminary, or special point,
that the paper in question was a check,
was determined as a question of law,
irasmuch as this was, as have been the
other cntests upon the issue, a case in
which the contract, with its provisions,
was not denied, whilst the legal effect
of it, involving a construction of its
terms, caused the doubt. The inquiry
has been of a character altogether different when any one or more of those
terms have been disputed, as when the
defendant has alleged that, as part of the
-igreement, grace was to be allowed, and
the plaintiff has thereupon joined issue ;
in which event a verdict has ended the
controversy independently of the general law of drafts and bills : Andrew et
a!. v. Blachly et a1., 11 Ohio, N. S. 95.
Such an issue of fact, of course, might
arise in an action brought on a check
drawn in the ordinary way ; just as, in
a suit upon a note at six months, a mutual stipulation that no grace at all
should be claimed, might be pleaded,
and constitute the sole question : and a
decision of a court of appeals upon writ
of error, in such a case, could establish

no general principle of law as to grace,
although whether or not grace in that
instance was to be allowed, would be so
adjudicated.
IV. Hence, in the classification of the
authorities, those bearing upon contracts, the terms of which as to grace
have been disputed, and which have
been defi
ned only by a jury, have beer.
separated from those with which, relatively to grace, a jury has had nothing
to do. There are then found, first, cases
in which, solely as matter of fact, grace
was or was not the claimant's right;
second, cases in which, as natter of law,
grace was due ; and third, cases in which
the law allowed no grace. The first of
these classes is of no value in the premises : Andrew et al. v. Blachly et aLh,
ante. The second and third seem to have
established the following general principles :
V. In the commercial world checks
and inland bills of exchange are distinguishable ; "and he who seeks to
make them identical in all respects may
unintentionally be producing an anomaly, instead of suppressing one:" STour,
J., In re Brown, 2 Story 502.
Not
that it can be denied that, in many respects, they are so much alike as, in certain contingencies, to be treated as identical: Chitty, Bills 16 ; Boem v. Sterling, 7 Term Rep. 423 ; Grant v.
Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1516 ; I B1. Rep.
485 ; Cruger v. Armstrong, 3 Johns.
Cas. 9 ; Murray v. Judah, 6 Cow.
490; Bank v. Spicer, 6 Wend. 443. A
check is an order upon a bailee of funds.
either a bank or a banker, to transfer a
named amount of the money held on
deposit for the drawer, to the drawee, or
to his assignee: Conroy v. Warren, 3
Johns. Cas. 261, 264; In re Brown, 2
Story 502; Brown v. Lusk-, 4 Yerger
216; Keene v. Beard, 8 C. B. N. S.
380. It is called a check as constituting a special kind of order in use in the
special class of bailment indicated ; but
it operates just as any other proper order
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would onexate between the owner of
goods and the depositary of them. It
is. in a sense, within the scope of the
law merchant, because it is mostly used
by merchants, and facilitates trade. It
is negotiable, not by virtue of a relationship to mercantile bills, but just as certificates of deposit, dock-warrants, bills
of lading, pass by assignment, by warrant of law, perhaps analogous to the
law of bills, but special to itself:
Wright v. Campbell, 4 Burr. 2046;
Lickbarrow v. lason, 2 Term R. 63;
Zwinga v. Samuda, 7 Taunt. 265 ; Lucas
v. Dorrein, 7 Taunt. 278 ; Keene v.
Beard, 8 C. B. N. S. 372; Ey're v.
Waller, 5 H. & N. 460; Sewel v. B.
R. Co., 9 C. B. 811. Its definition necessarily involves the idea of the actual
custody of funds on the part of the
bailee. in trust for the bailor ; and necessarily limits the character of the
bailee to that of a bank, or a banker;
because those whose business it is to
hold money on deposit are banks or
bankers; and excludes any idea of his
being, as such bailee, a party in trading
operations. The bank which pays
money over its counter, on the order of
its customers, becomes no more a party
thereby to its customers' transactions in
the use of that money, than does the
warehouseman who delivers bales of cotton on proper order to persons so entitled to carry them off. No bailee can
claim time before relinquishing the thing
bailed, on the -ground that time is allowed to certain parties to bills of exchange before they must pay them. As
well might a warehouseman demand
three days of grace upon the presentation to him of an order for merchandise
in his stores, as a banker when directed
by his principal to surrender his money.
VI. Of course, as the owner of merchandise, so the owner of money, may
give special orders to his agent ; as, to
deliver on a certain day in the future.
But this would be a modification of the
order at the discretion of the principal,

not authorizing the agent to further
modify it, by delaying his compliance
for some days after the day named. He
is bound to surrender the property at the
time duly indicated by its owner. And
it is only, as has been discerned in England, a question of policy, whether such
orders for money should be allowed.
VII. Now it is because banks and
bankers, besides being the mere baileeg
of money, have become, also, in respect
of other funds or credits, parties in commercial transactions, and act as principals in the negotiation of papers not
wholly unlike checks, that the difficulty
has arisen. A bank or banker may legitimatelymake, accept, endorse, and be
payee, on bills of exchange and promissory notes: and not rarely a bank or
banker is called upon'to honor drafts;
in which event, of dourse, as it is in no
sense a bailee, but a principal, in the
transaction, just as any merchant would
be, it is entitled to the privileges attaching to the character. And not rarely it
acts, relatively to different affairs, in the
character of bailee and of party with one
and the same person. Hence the question may arise, in a given instance,
whether the paper was of one or the
other description indicated ?
This depends upon the transaction.
If it is manifested simply by the paper
itself, as a question of law the court de.
cides whether that paper is a mere order
upon a bailce, or an inland bill of exchange. If facts are established together
with the paper, then the court states the
legal effect of all together. But if it decides that the paper is merely a check, it
must, in the absence of statutory provision, decide that, by the law merchant,
the doctrine of grace has no application
thereto. And it is to be observed that,
as the drawer can very well state whethpr
he was drawing on a depositary, ootherwise, if he does not, and leaves all
to the paper itself, the circumstance may
make against him.
VIII. In the principal case, then, and
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in all the cognate cases, the question has
been, whether or not by the contract of
the parties, the paper given was merely
an order of the bailor of funds upon his
bailee, in favor of a third party; or
whether it was a draft by the former
upon the latter, drawn as between merchant and merchant in a transaction to
which the law of agency did not primarily apply. If it was a principal's direction
to his agent, it mattered not at what
time, whether present or future, compliance was directed ; and although a statute, or tle agreement of the parties,
might have provided that iome time
should be allowed to elapse after the
date stated, to enable the bailee to collect his principal's funds, and obey the
command, yet such provision, though
legal, would not have been upon the prin.
ciple of grace in commercial law in th,,
former instance, any more than in thi
latter; and the absence of such a prcvision would, of course, leave the coi.tract beyond the scope of that principle.
Obviously, if a man gives anoth3r
such r~n order upon his bailee as cannot
be complied with till some day in the
future, it is rational to conclude that he
is not prepared to 'transfer his funds at
once; and, consequently, that he secures time to himself with a view to being prepared in the interval. Whether
such checks should not be frowned upon,
as calculated to confuse the transactions
of men, and induce complications in
commercial law likely to prejudice honest dealers, is a grave, but merely collateral, consideration.
IX. Turning again to the principal
case, it is found that of this doubt the
plaintiff in error sought to avail himself.
Ie argued that the paper, payable in the
future, stamped as a draft, and negotiated in the market, was, in law, a bill
oi exchange ; and urged that, as a matter
of policy, whenever there was no agreement cemonstrated in a special instance
to make such an instrument a check,every
order for money not immediately payable

should be held to be a bill. ie sought
to reduce all meicantile paper in Pennsylvania to two classes ;-paper within
the statute of 1857, and paper without
that statute. The main point which this
would have involved, would have been
the decision that, in the absence of a
special agreement, a particular necessary
to the definition of a check was that it
was immediately payable. This was for
some time held to be an essential characteristic of checks.
A suggestion of this nature was anticipated by Judge STORY, whose opinion
in the matter of Brown was the most
exhaustive which has yet been had upon
the subject; and it was in the same way
met upon presentation. If the doctrine
was sound, papers thus to be considered
bills of exchange were subject to the
general rule whereby bills of exchange
are presentable for acceptance, and protestable if not then accepted ; a rule the
observance of which is vital to the conservation of trade, and yet nhich no
acute business man would deem applicable in cases of paper made as was Champion's, where a depositary was the
drawee. To this argument, unanswerable if the facts assumed existed, there
was opposed the assertion that, independently of general principles, the paper
then in, question had not been presented
for acceptance ; the point, therefore, had
not arisen: and that, as was said by
BRLE, C. J., in Keene v. Beard, 8 C. B.
N. S. 380, for all that appeared to the
contrary, the bank was not indicated as
bailee, but as a trader, and may have
been prepared to accept when applied
to: an assertion which, coming as it did
from the maker of the paper, was, in the
absence of direct evidence on the head,
equivalent to the declaration that the instrument itself indicated that with other
features of bills as distinguished from
checks, it possessed the special characteristic referred to, was presentable for
acceptance, and would have been accepted if presented. It was this poini
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w hch was decided by the light of a local
usage. "If we determine that an order
like that before us is not presentable fjr
acceptance before maturity, we settle the
question. It is a check and not a bill
of exchange. More than twenty years
ago the banks of Philadelphia, under the
advice of their counsel, adopted this
rule, and it has been their uniform practice ever since. The usage of the banks
in the commercial metropolis of the state
ought to have great weight in determining a question of this character." By
its tenor and effect, as matter offact, the
paper was not presentable for acceptance,
and in contemplation of law the bank
had not agreed to accept it. Had the
usage of the Philadelphia banks not been
relied upon, it seems 'reasonable to believe that the plaintiff in error would
have prevailed.
X. It is not to be denied that the dealings between large institutions and
merchants, which in the last century,
and for some time in the present, were
strictly transactions between principal
and agent, not materially differing in
effect from the operations of the Italian
money-changers behind their benches in
Lombard street, have altered with the
development of complications in the
affairs of men. Banks now are something more than the custodians of coin,
not so secure if stored elsewhere. Their
customers do not make deposits for safe
keeping, but to obtain discounts, advances, and the intangible, but very appreciable, advantages of their countenance, and recommendation in business;
and although they serve the agents of
estates, and some heads of families, as
depositaries merely, these classes of men
are in an insignificant minority, and do
not at all indicate their business sphere.
They are powerful, and it is rather their
province to bestow favors than, as public
servants, to receive them. Nor can it
be denied, if customs, generai in the
business world, although not established
S, -,- - -nt
e relied upon to

modify the otherwise necessary effect of
the instruments they trade in, that papers, called checks, and certainly designed to pass funds from the credit of
one man to that of another, are constantly presented for acceptance, and so
honored. The last rule in this connection of the New York banks is, that
checks certified are to be marked, "I Certified, payable through the clearinghouse:" which "is really saying in
effect," says the Journal of Commerce,
"1This draft is accepted, payable tomorrow through the exchanges." The
plaintiff in error argued that, for all
that appeared to the contrary, the bank
upon which he drew might thus have accepted his draft payable in the future.
And there is, scientifically, no difference between certifying a check to be
good, and accepting a bill of exchange.
The relation in which the parties stand
to each other determines the effect of the
acts. In the first instance the bank
says: he is entitled to draw upon me
for the amount named; and renders
itself primarily liable by this representation. In the second instance there is
nothing more. And although we have,
from long usage, assumed as necessary
the existence of an actual deposit of
funds in the vaults of an institution which
certifies a check, and a transfer of those
funds from one account to another upon
the making of the certificate ; and from
our experience have found it unreasonable to go this far in the case of a commercial drawee, and have merely assumed that, if he has not now the funds
he is answerable for them, and will in
time procure them; this divergence is
wholly immaterial, and induces no distinction whatever in principle. That
Champion's order drawn upon a fellowvtradesman, would have been a draft.
seems to be a part of the reasoning of
the court in the principal case. That,
drawn as it was, it might have been
certified, is clear. And the duty to accept or certify depends upon whether or
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not there is a contfhct, express or implied, to perform this duty in a given
instance. The character of the paper
may he a consideration beyond all this,
depending upon whether he who accepts
or certifies is a mere bailee or a principal party in the transaction.
XI. As the dealings of men have
thus changed in their general characteristies, it is expedient to consider how
far applicable to the new combinations
are the old tests of commercial law.
The scientific distinction between a
check and a bill, if it is correctly stated
at the beginning of this note, certainly
remains to this day.unaffected by those
changes ; but the nodes by which in
given instances that distinction used to
be ascertained are no longer safe, or
even available. A check, in commerce,
may be payable in future; may be accepted ; need not be drawn upon a bank
or banker ; need not represent at its
date a sum of money actually on deposit
with the drawee. But such a check, in
law, would be a bill. If the fact was
established, however, that such a check
was, after all, merely an appropriation
of funds held by a bailee upon deposit,
the presumption of law that it was a bill

would be modified, and the paper woulc
remain a check. In the absence of a
statutory provision for grace, such h
check would be immediately payable at
maturity. But the essential fac . thu.
stiggested would necessarily have to ba
admitted,-be found by a jury,-or be
established by what is analogous to a
verdict. Otherwise, at law, grace woule
be a matter of right.
It seems clear, then, that where there
is no legislative provision for grace, a

check is never entitled thereto ; and that
in every instance the question of grace
must be settled by the special -circumstances of the instance itself, that is to
say, by the terms of the contract of the
parties. The general principle is beyond
discussion. lf it does not operate in a
special case, it is because it has no application, or because being primd facie
applicable, some statute has created an
exception to it, or the agreement of the
parties has validly excluded that case
from its scope. But this does not lesser
the frequent difficulties of deciding
whether or not, in law, the paper ex
amined is a check at all.

Supreme Court Zf Errorsof Connecticut.
DALE v. GEAR.'
The contract implied by law from a blank endorsement of a negotiable note
before maturity by the payee, is as certain and absolute as if written out in full,
and parol evidence is not admissible to contradict it.
This rule is applicable between endorser and endorsee, and it is not competent
for the former to prove a cotemporaneous, naked agreement, that an unrestricted
endorsement should be operative as a restricted one only in bar of an action by
,he latter.
But any fact or transaction which raises an equity between such parties, and
shows it to be inequitable or a fraud to enforce the contract,-as that the endorsee
I We are indebted fo. this case to the courtesy of Mr. HOOKER, the Reportzr.Etis. Am. LAW REG.
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an agent, or that the note was endorsed for a special purpose creating a trust,
or for the accommodation of the endorsee, or pursuant to an antecedent agreement that the note should be taken for a debt or for goods, on the responsibility
of the maker alone, may be shown by parol in bar of the action.

AssUMPSIT against the defendant as endorser of a promissory
note; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in the county of
New Haven.
The defendant pleaded in bar, "that the said plaintiffs ought
not to have or maintain their aforesaid action against the defendant, because he says that at the time when the defendant so as
afoi~esaid endorsed said note, in consideration of the agreement
of the said defendant to endorse said note in blank, and to omit
prefixing the words 'without recourse' to his said endorsement,
they, the said plaintiffs, by parol, then and there promised and
agreed that they never would have recourse to the said defendant
upon said note or upon said endorsement, but would for ever save
him, the said defendant, harmless from all liability by reason of
his making said endorsement in blank, and omitting to prefix the
the words 'without recourse' to his said endorsement. And the
defendant avers that upon the faith of the aforesaid promise and
agreement of the said plaintiffs, and in consideration thereof, he
did so as aforesaid endorse said note in blank, and did omit to
prefix the words 'without recourse' to said endorsement. All
which he is ready to verify. Wherefore he prays judgment," &c.
To this plea the plaintiffs demurred, and the case was reserved
upon these pleadings for the advice of this court.
Z.
. Bristol, in support of the demurrer, cited 2 Parsons on
Notes and Bills 23; Smith's Mere. Law 128, 129; Prescott Bank
v. Caverly, 7 Gray 217; Biley v. Gerrish,9 Cush. 104; Woodbtrv
Savings Bank v. Charter Oak Insurance Co., 29 Conn. 381 ;
Hfoare v. Graham, 3 Camp. 57; Coupy y. H7arden, 7 Taunt.
159; Free v. Hawkins, 8 Id. 92; Odam v. Beard, 1 Blackf.
191; Wilson v. Black, 6 Id. 509 ; Fullerv. MtcDonald, 8 Greenl.
213; Crocker v. Getchell, 23 Me. 892; 1 Chitty P1. 233, 234;
Wyat v. Aland, 1 Salk. 325; The King v. Stevens, 5 East 244;
Perkins v. Catlin, 11 Conn. 213; Castle v. Candee, 16 Id. 223;
Rey v. Simpson, 22 How. 341 ; Downer v. 0hesebrough, 36 Conn.
39; Wells v. Jackson, 6 Blackf. 40.
J. S. Beach, contri, cited 1 Swift's Dig. 434; -Perkinsv.

DALE v. GEAR.

Cathn, 11 Conn. 213 ;- Castle v. Candee, 16 Id. 223; Case v.
Spaulding, 24 Id. 578; Hill v. Ely, 5 S. & R. 363; Patterson
v. Todd, 18 Penn. St. R. 426, 434; Birleback v. Wilkim, 22
Id. 26; Riley v. aerrish, 9 Cash. 104; Chitty on Bills 144;
Pike v. Street, Al. & M4. 227; 2 Parsons on Notes and Bills 519,
Tappin v. Clarke, 82 .lonn. 56; Downer v. Clesebrough, 36 Id

39.
BUTLER, C. J.-We have given this case the consideration
which, as involving au important commercial question, it has
seemed to require, and are of opinion that the plea cannot be
sustained on principle or by authority.
First, it is not sustaihable on principle.
The rule that parol evidence is not admissible to contradict or
vary a written contract is founded in the highest principles of
public policy, and there is no class of contracts to which it should
be more inflexibly applied than to those connected with bills of
exchange and promissory notes. Nor is there any one of the
varied and special coftracts, so connected, in respect to which
the application of the rule is more important than the contract
of warranty implied by law from the blank endorsement of a
negotiable note by the payee before maturity. It is absolutely
essential to the negotiability of such a note that the rule to which
we have alluded should be applied to it, and it has always been
so applied when the note has been negotiated to a second endorsee, and an effort has been made to prove some cotemporaneous parol agreement in bar.
But it has sometimes been claimed, and is claimed in support of
the plea in this case, that notwithstanding the rule is so applied in
favor of a bondfde holder to whom the note has been negotiated,
yet as between the endorser and endorsee, the original parties to
the contract of endorsement, the rule should not be applied. But
the answer must be, that the contract of endorsement is implied by
law as clearly and perfectly from the blank endorsement of a negotiable note, irrespective of any contingency of negotiation, as
if written out in full when endorsed. And if, as between the origi.
nal parties, there is any equity existing dehors the instrument,
which should prevent the indorsee from enforcing the contract, it
must be set up as an equity provable in equity, to bar an apparent
legal liability; and. cannot be shown because the rule of evidence
to which we have alluded is not applicable. The rule is as appli
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cable to such parties as to others, and the true theory is that the
relation or antecedent agreement, out of which the equity arises,
may be shown between them, and proof of it does not necessarily
contradict the contract.
There are four classes of- cases in which, as exceptional cases,
and as between the original parties, endorser and endorsee, any
relation, antecedent agreement, or state of facts from which a controlling equity arises, may be pleaded and proved by parol in bar
of an action on the warranty. Thus the relation of principal and
agent may be shown-for the agent takes no title or warranty
from the endorser, but holds as agent. So, secondly, it may be
shown that the note was endorsed to the holder for some speciai
purpose, and is holden in trust, as where it is endorsed and delivered for collection merely. Lawrence v. &tonington Bank, 6
Conn. 521, is an example of this class of cases in our own reports.
In like manner, thirdly, the relation of principal and surety may
be shown, and that the endorsement was made at the request and
for the accommodation of the immediate endorsee, for the equity
of the relation forbids the enforcement of the contract. Such was
Case v. Spaulding, 24 Conn. 578. So, fourthly, it may be shown
that there was an equity arising from an antecedent transaction,
including an agreement that the note should be taken in sole reliance on the responsibility of the maker, and that it was endorsed
in order to transfer the title in pursuance of such agreement, and
that the attempt to enforce it is a fraud. Such was -Downer v.
Oke8ebrough, 36 Conn. 39. These exceptions illustrate the rule.
But this plea shows no agency, trust, equitable relation or equity
connected with an antecedent transaction constituting a consideration for the agreement, or which would justify a court of equity
in interfering to prevent an enforcement of the contract of warranty which the law implies. It presents a naked case of an
attempt to prove by parol, that a clear and unambiguous contract
of warranty is not such, and to contradict it in terms-to turn an
endorsement without restriction,before maturity, into a restricted
endorsement. Such a plea cannot be sustained without a violation
of essential principles.
Nor is the plea supported by any well-considered and unquestioned authority.
The defendant claims, in the first-place, that it is supported by
the decisions of this state, and he relies on a class of cases where
VOLr.
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the action was upon a non-negotiable note, or a negotiable note
endorsed by one not a party to it, which by our law stands on the
same ground. But those decisions cannot sustain him. That
class of blank endorsements is not controlled by commercial usage,
and does not import an absolute contract of warranty. The contract presumed by law from them is presumed 1)rimdfacie only,
and differs in different states. In this state such endorsements are
not only primd fqcie, but conditional, that is, that the note shall
be collectible of the maker by due diligence. In Massachusetts
and New York such an endorsement is treated as an absolute
guaranty, or the endorser charged as a joint promissor. In all
the presumption is treated as one of fact, rather than one of law,
and the real contract made between the parties, if a special one,
may be written over the signature of the endorser. It is otherwise
in a note like this.
There are then broad lines of distinction between the two classes
of endorsements, and the defendant's plea is not supported by the
class of decisions referred to.
The defendant also relies on Case v. Spaulding, 24 Conn. 578,
but it does not sustain him. There the defendant was not the
payee, and as second endorser was not liable to the payees of the
note, for they, as first endorsers, were bound to pay it. The defendant also endorsed at the request of the plaintiff as surety, for
his accommodation, and was within one of the classes of equitable
exceptions, where the relation on which the equity rests may be
shown. The dictum of Judge ELLsWOITH, confined within the
limits called for by the case, was undoubtedly true, but the defendant does not bring himself within the exception.
The defendant further relies on -Downer v. Ukesebrouglh, 86
Conn. 89, but he is not sustained by that case. It was not put
to us as a case where the antecedent contract which created an
equity between the parties could not be shown under our law, if
the contract had been made here, in connection with the agreement
claimed, to show that the plaintiff was attempting to perpetrate a
fraud, but as a case where, by the laws of New York, where the
contract was made, it could not be proved by parol. The case
turned therefore solely on the question whether the law of evidence
of the forum, or of the lex loci contractus, should govern. In
that aspect only we considered and decided it, and that question
alone is discussed in the opinion. If the questions which are raised
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nere nad been raised there, we should have holden without hesitation, first, that the endorsement of a negotiable note before maturity
by the payee creates an absolute warranty to the immediate, as
well as all subsequent endorsees, that the instrument and the
antecedent signatures thereon are genuine; that the endorser has
title to the instrument and is competent to bind himself by the
endorsement, and that the maker will pay it on due presentment
when it is due; but that, if he does not, the endorser will pay it if
due notice is given him of such .dishonor; and, secondly, that no
special agreement-as that the unrestricted endorsement was intended or agreed to be a restricted one-can be shown by parol
evidence, except in the classes of cases adverted to, where an equitable relation existed between the parties in respect to the endorsement when it was made, which rendered the enforcement of the
contract inequitable and fraudulent. Equity overrides all rights.
and suspends the operation of all legal rules between original
parties, when necessary to prevent a fraudulent use of them, and
therefore the exceptions mentioned have been recognised and applied at law. Downer v. Uhesebrough was clearly within one of
the exceptions, but this case is not.
The defendant under his second point cites three cases from
Pennsylvania to show that the contract set up in the plea was
provable there by parol. On examining those cases we think the
law of Pennsylvania is otherwise. The first case cited is that of
Hlill v. Ely, 5 S. & R. 363. The marginal note sustains his
claim, but the case does not. In that case it appears that the
defendant purchased coffee of the plaintiff upon an express agreement that the plaintiff should receive in full payment the notes of
on, Jabez Lamb, without the responsibility of the defendant. The
notes were payable to the order of the defendant and were handed
to the plaintiff, pursuant to agreement without endorsement. The
plaintiff then said to the defendant: "Hill, you must endorse those
notes ;" to which Hill replied: "That is not our understanding."
The plaintiff rejoined: "They are made payable to you; how
will you convey them to me? You must endorse them, in order
that I may collect them." Hill then said: "I endorse them, but
remember I am not to be held responsible for their payment."
The zase was put to the court by the distinguished counsel engaged, solely on the ground that the attempt of Hill to charge
Ely upon his endorsement was a fraud, and the court so held.
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They say: "The evidence offered went to prove a direct fraud in
obtaining the endorsements, or their perversion to a use never in
tended-a fraudulent purpose." The court further say, that paro:
or extrinsic evidence would be received in chancery to reach such
a fraud, and therefore would be received in their courts at law;
that the relief in equity would be grounded, not upon the admissibility of parol evidence as between such parties to contradict the
writing, but to show extrinsic facts, raising an equity dehor; the
instrument, to prevent the fraudulent purpose. The court also
say that the evidence was admissible to show a trust between Hill
and Ely, for the purpose of collecting the notes and applying the
proceeds in paymentfor the coffee. They recognise the leading
case of Hoare v. Graham, 3 Campb. 57, as law, but distinguish
it, because in Hoare v. Graham there was no allegation of fraud.
The case is on all fours with Downer v. Chesebrough. In both
there was an antecedent contract which raised an equity dehors
the endorsement, which made the attempt to enforce the contract
implied by law from the endorsement a fraudulent one, relievable
in equity. It is implied in both decisions, that in a case like this,
where no equity existed, such a contract could not be shown by
parol.
Hill v. Ely was not overruled or shaken by the subsequent
cases cited. Pattersonv. Todd, 18 Penn. St. R. 426, was the case
of a negotiable note, but it was endorsed by the payee when overdue, and there was no subsequent demand and notice. The main
question in the case was, whether such a demand should have been
made upon the maker, and notice given to the endorser. It was
held that the endorsement was equivalent to drawing a new bill,
and that demand should have been made in a reasonable time, and
notice given of the dishonor. The court also held that under the
circumstances of that case, the defendant might show by parol
evidence, that he said he would not warrant the notes. But the
court did not question the authority of Hill v. Ely, nor does it
appear that it has ever been questioned. The remaining case
cited from Pennsylvania was the case of a non-negotiable note. It
has no bearing upon this case.
The defendant under his third point cites a case from Massachusetts, and dicta from Judge SHAW. But the note in that case
was not negotiable, and the case and dicta are unimportant.
The defendant also cites one English case, that of Pike v.
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Sreet, M. & M. 227, in support of his claim. It is sufficient;
Bay of that case, that it is not directly upon the point, is contrai
to the present current of English decisions, and was questioned
the recent case of Poster v. Jolly, 1 Cromp., Mees. & Ros. 703.
These are all the decisions cited by the defendant, and there
not one of them directly in point, which can be relied upon a3
authority.
On the other hand, the current of decisions in England is directly
against the admission of such evidence. ifoare v. Graham, 3
Campb. 57; -oupy v. Hardy, 7 Taunton 159; Free v. Hawkins,
8 Id. 92.
And the adverse decisions in this country which are directly in
point are quite numerous. .ank of Albion v. Smith, 27 Barb.
489; Thompson v. Ketcham, 8 Johns. 146; Pattersonv. Hull, 9
Cowen 747; Payne v. Ladue, 1 Hill 116; Hzall v. "ewcombe, 7
Ed. 416; Odam v. Beard, 1 Blackf. 191; Puller v. MeDonald,
Greenl. 213; Crocker v. aretchel, 23 Maine 392; Wilson v.
G
?laec, 6 Blackf. 509; Barry v. Morse, 3 New Hamp. 132.
The Superior Court must therefore be advised that the plea is
insufficient.
The distinction made in the foregoing
opinion between showing by direct evidence that the endorsement was a limited
one, for a special purpose, and showing
the same by the relation of the parties
or the nature of the transaction, in order
to raise an equity or trust in the endorsee for the benefit of the endorser,
seems rather thin and shadowy to the
unprofessional mind. But, in regard to
certain classes of cases, it is no doubt
well founded in law. But if we understand the full force of the decision, it
seems to us to rest solely on the ground,
that the plaintiff, in attempting to enforce the endorsement according to its
legal force, is perpetrating a fraud upon
the defendant. The defence of fraud, in
an action of assumpsit, is always avail.
able by way of special plea, although it
may with equal propriety be given in
evidence under the general issue; and
it may always be shown by oral proof,
although such proof may contradict a

written contract. This is always admissible by way of defence, because the
proof is received to show fraud, or trust,
growing out of the transaction, and not
for the purpose of contradicting, or
giving a new construction to, the written contract. This rule is applied in the
familiar case of giving an absolute deed
of land, intended merely for the security
of a debt, which the granteeis attempting
to enforce according to its terms. And
the same will be true, where property,
real or personal, is conveyed to one,
where the consideration proceeded from
another; the law will raise an implied
or resulting trust, which may be enforced in a court of equity, not coming
within the terms of the Statute of Frauds.
Many other cases might be stated, and
any number of authorities cited in support of the general proposition involved
-that fraud or trust may be shown in
defence of an action of assuwnpsit, where
the entire right is in t;.o defendant. If
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the case rests upon mere trust, still sub- their actual understanding and agreesisting, the proper remedy will be in ment is always to be regarded."
Anu
equity, as when the plaintiff holds the in Carver v. Warren, 5 Mass. 545, PAR
property in security for delts, not em- SON5s Ch. J., says: "If, as has beer
braced in the action. Authority will suggested, the defendant endorses his
scarcely be needful in support of such name as guarantor, and the present endorsement has been made [or] filled ut
elementary principles.
But upon the main questin involved without his consent, or any authority
in the case, how far a blank tndorsement from him, he should not have demurred,
upon a negotiable promissory note is but should have pleaded the generals-re,
explainable by oral proof, if made while and on the trial he might have availed
the note is current, or not overdue, there himself of this defence." But these are
secms to be considerable conflict in the cases where the notes were not negotiacases. Mr. Justice STORY, Promissory ble, and the endorsement by those not
Notes 148, lays down the rule as doubt- before parties to the contract. But even
ful, or not fully settled by the English in such cases the authorities- already
cases, citing Free v. Hawkins, 8 Taunt. cited and many others show that the
92, Hoarev. Graham, 3 Camp. 57, as hav- blank endorsement, prlmdtfacie, imposes
ing intimated an opinion against the ad- the obligation of an original .maker.
missibility of such evidence in explana- And we should have said, that a blank
tion or contradiction of the primid facie endorsement by the payee of a promislegal intendment of the endorsement. sory note expresses only a primd facie
Butadds: "1These doubts, however, have obligation. We see no good reason why
been overcome in America, and the doc- such an obligation, as between the partrine is established that such evidence is ties to it, should be held any more sacred
admissible:" citing Taunton Bank v. becausethe instrument is negotiable than
Richardson, 5 Pick. 436, 443; Central in any other case of blank endorsement.
Bank v. Davis, 19 Id. 373, 375 ; Leffing- The truth is that a blank endorsement is
well v. White, 1 Johns. Ca. 99; Union always held to import nothing absoBankv. Hyde, 6 Wheat. 572.
lately, and may always be shown to have
The general rule of the American law been given for a different purmose from
unquestionably is, that, while a blank that to which it has been applied. It
endorsement of a note or bill will have has sometimes been said even, that para primn facie legal significance, which, ties will be affected by any equity bein the absence of proof to the contrary, tween the parties to a blank endorsement,
must prevail, it is nevertheless compe- provided they are informed, before they
tent, in ordinary cases, to show by oral accept it, that it was given in blank:
proof, that such was not the nature of Russellv. Langstaffe, 2 Doug. 514. This
the obligation intended to have been as- would not probably be held to extend
sumed by the endorser. This has been to the endorsement of a negotiable proheld to be law certainly as to all notes missory note by the payee while it was
not negotiable, and especially when en- still current, for that is the common
dorsed by those not before parties to the mode of making such notes and bills
contract: J'ocdln v. Ames, 3 MIass. 274; negotiable in the market, and any one
Nrelson v. Dubois, 13 Johns. 175; Bar- who fairly became the bolder might lawrows v. Lane, 5 Vt. 161, where PHELPS, fully fill up the endorsement in the usual
J., says: "Whatever may bethe effect of mode. "Pay the contents to the bearer,
a blank signature as it respects third per- value received."
And perhaps it is fair
sons, in case it is attached to negotiable to say, that oral evidence is no more
paper, yet as between the original parties admissible to explain or contradict the
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endorsement when made in blank than
when made in fall. The fact that its
real i:uport may always be shown, when
the endorsee attempts to enlarge his rights
by making broader claims than his just
rights entitle him to make, in order to
establish fraud, amounts practically to
the same thing as receiving the evidence
in explanation or contradiction of the
endorsement, and at the same time preserves the symmetry of the law. In the
case of Ross v. Espy, 66 Penn. St. R.
481, it is decided that the actual contract
may be shown in all cases of blank endorsement, citing numerous cases in that
state.. And we must say we have always regarded this as the settled law.
The abstract question, whether the
legal intendment of a contract or instrument is any more open to explanation
by oral proof, than the very language
used is one which can properly admit of
no doubt. The legal or natural implications, attendant upon the use of a term,
are as much a part of the "language"
of a contract or instrument, as are the
more direct and explicit meanings attached to the words. "One hundred
pounds" admits of no latitude of construction except with reference to the

commodities to be estimated, i. e.,
whether of troy, avoirdupois or apothecary standard. But "1one hundred
weight" carries, by implication, twelve
additional pounds, avoirdupois; and,
unless controlled by usage, is no more
subject to contradiction or deduction,
than are the hundred pounds itself.
The same has been held in regard to the
boundaries of land. A given number
of acres off from a particular part of the
lot, implies that the section shall be
separated by lines corresponding with
the lot lines, and this implication cannot
be explained or contradicted by oral
proof: Beecher v. Parmerle, 9 Vt. 352;
Rich v. Elliot, 10 Id. 211. The same
rule is recognised in the construction of
wills. The primary and natural import
of the words must prevail unless that
becomes impracticable, when a secondary meaning may be resorted to, in
order to escape some otherwise inevitable absurdity. The decision of the principal case is most unquestionable upon
general principle; how far blank endorsements may be treated as exceptional, we need not further inquire.
I. F. R.

Supreme Court of -Errorsof Connecticut.
GRAVES v. THE HARTFORD AND NEW YORK StEAMBOAT
COMPAN1.
It is a clear duty belonging to common carriers of merchandise under-their con
tract, to deliver his goods to the c'nsignee if he presents himself at the proper
place and in proper time to receive them, and, in such case, there is no room, nor
any occasion, for the interposition of a warehouseman, although the carriers make
known and regular transits, and have a warehouse and platforms for the delivery
of goods at the end of the transit ; and the carrier is not discharged from liability.
as a carrier, by placing such goods either on the platform or in the warehouse for
delivery. And the consignee is entitled to a fair and reasonable time and opportunity to receive his goods, and until he has had such time and opportunity, the
goods remain in the care of the carrier as such.

GRAVES v. H. & N. Y. STEAMBOAT CO.
ACTION on the case against the defendants as common carriers,
for the loss of twelve bales of cotton; tried in the Superior
Court, to the jury, who returned a verdict for the defendants.
The plaintiffs moved for a new trial for errors in the charge. The
case is fully stated in the opinion.

ff. C. Robinson, and P. . Mather of New York, in support
of the motion, cited Grouch v. G. W. Railway Cb., 2 H. & N.
491, 500; Ostranderv. Brown, 15 Johns. 39; isk v. Newton, 1
Denio 45, 47; Gibson v. Culver, 17 Wend. 305; McDonald v.
Western Railroad Corporation,34 N. Y. 497; Penner v. B. and
S. -L. Railroad Co., 46 Barb. 108; Barclay v. Clyde, 2 E. D.
Smith 95; M3iller v. Steam Nay. Co., 10 N. Y. 431, 436; Goold
v. Chapin, 20 Id. 259; E.ly v. N. IT Steamboat Co., 53 Barb.
207, 215; Northrop v. Syracuse Railroad Co., 5 Abbot's Pr. R.
425; Eagle v. White, 6 Whart. 505; ifemphill v. Chenie, 6,W.
& S. 62, 66; Clarke v. Needles, 25 Penn. St. R. 338; P. and I.
Bank v. Ohamplain TransportationCo., 23 Verm. 186; Winslow
v. Y7. and X. Railroad Co., 42 Verm. 700, 705; Moses v. B. and
H. Railroad Co., 32 N. H. 523; ff. C. Railroad Co. v. Ward,
2 Mich. 538; Rome Railroad Co. v. Sullivan, 14 Ga. 277; Wood
v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 345; Adams Express Co. v. Jarnell, 31 Ind.
20, 23; A. and T. Railroad Co. v. Kidd, 35 Ala. 209; Sleade v.
-Payne,14 La. Ann. 453; ff. and -E.Railroad Co. v. Ayres, 29
N. J. 393; Merwin v. Butler, 17 Conn. 139; Converse v. N. and
N. Y. -TransportationCo., 33 Id. 166; Salmon Palls Manufacturing Co. v. Bark Tangier, 21 Monthly L. R. (N. S.) 6; Certain
Logs of Mahogany, 2 Sumner. 589 ; Owners of the Mary Washington v. Ayres, 5 Am. Law. Reg. (N. S.) 692; The Eddy, 5
Wall. 481, 495; 2 Kent. Com. 604; Story on Bailm. sec. 448;
1 Parsons on Cont. 671; 2 Redfield on Railways, §.157; Merritt
v. 0. C. Railway Co., 11 Allen 80; N. P. Co. v. B. and X. Railroad Co., 1 Gray 263; Stevens v. B. and 1f. Railroad Co., Id.
277; Hamilton v. Nickerson, 11 Allen 308; Sessions v. Western
-RailroadCorporation,16 Gray 132; ifickox v. Naugatuck Railroad Co., 31 Conn. 283; M31erriam H. and N. Hf. Railroad Co.,
20 Id. 360.
R. D. Rubbard, contri.-By the law as it formerly stood, and
as it now stands as applicable to all carriers by water not having
warehouses of their own for the storage of goods, and not making
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regu!ar transits, the carrier was. discharged on unlading his goods
on the wharf and giving notice to the consignee; or, if not called
for, and particularly if the carrier wished to preserve his freight
lien, he might place them in the custody of the wharfinger, who
is only a warehouseman under another name. Story on Bailm.,
§ 448; 3 Kent. Com. 215; Flanders on Shipping, §§ 278, 275,
278; Chickering v. Fowler, 4 Pick. 371; Graciev. Maine Ins.
Co., 8 Cranch 88.
From this principle it would naturally result, that where the
wharf of the carrier is made a gratuitous warehouse, and the carriage is in point of face performed, and where the goods, not
being called for when unluden, are placed in the warehouse, or,
what is the same thing, on the platform attached thereto, for convenience of delivery to the freight-owner, the carrier should
thenceforth stand accountable only as warehouseman. Accordingly this rule has been adopted in the best considered modern
cases in this country. N. P. Co. v. B. and f. Railroad Co., 1
Gray 263; Sessions v. Western RailroadCorporation,16 Id. 132 ;
Jaceson v. S. V. Railroad Co., 23 Cal. 268; 1. 0. Railroad Co.
v. Alexander, 20 Ill. 23; Porter v. C. and R. I. Railroad Co.,
20 Ill. 407, 410; New A. and S. Railroad Co. v. Campbell, 12
Ind. 55; Neal v. WF. and 7. Railroad Co., 8 Jones's Law 482;
Francisv. -?. and S. C. Railroad Co., 25 Iowa 60.
The rule of the charge requested by the plaintiff is against law,
and incongruous. The liability of an insurer of goods in carriage
terminates with the landing of the goods. Mansur v. Ins. Co., 12
Gray 521; 1 Phillips on Ins., ch. 11, see. 2, § 972. It would
seem reasonable that the liability of the carrier should have a
like termination with the liability of the insurer.
An act of Congress has exempted marine carriers from liability
for injuries by fire on shipboard not caused by negligence of the
carriers: 1 Brightly's Dig. 834, § 49. It would seem passing
strange that, in case of accidental fire destroying both cargo and
bottom when the ship was half unladen, the carrier should be held
liable for that half of the cargo discharged and destroyed on the
wharf, and not liable for the half destroyed on shipboard.
SEYmoUR, J.-This is an action against the defendants as common carriers of merchandise by steamboat between Hartford and
New York, for the loss of twelve bales of cotton. The case was

GRAVES v. H. & N. Y. STEAMBOAT CO.

tried to the jury, who returned a verdict for the defenidants, and
the plaintiffs asked for a new trial on the ground that the jury
were misdirected. The facts as detailed in the motion are in substance as follows:
On the 19th of September, 1867, the plaintiffs delivered to the
defendants in New York twelve bales of cotton, to be conveyed
to their agent in Hartford. The defendants gave an informal
bill of lading or receipt as follows:
"gNEw

YORK, Sept. 19th, 1867.

Ree'd from R. R. Graves & Co., in good order, Hartford boat,
for W. F. Willard, agent, Hartford, Conn., marked W. F. W.,
Hartford, 12 bales cotton.
Signed by
For the Hartford & N. Y. Steamboat Co."
Willard had notice of the shipment by invoice sent by mail,
and also, on the 20th of September, between 8.30 and 9 o'clock
A. m., he was notified by defendants' servant that the consignment was on the boat at the wharf in Hartford- Willard forthwith directed his carman to go for the cotton, and he, with assistants to help load, called for it at about 11.30 to 11.45 o'clock.
The defendants refused to deliver it, saying "it is not off the
boat; there is so much other freight and it is so far back we have
not got at it." The carman then went with his men to dinner,
and between 12.30 and 1 o'clock again started for the cotton.
The defendants' warehouse and freight upon the dock were then
in flames.
The defendants had a commodious warehouse, with suitable and
convenient open and covered platforms, situated upon their wharf,
for the reception, delivery and storage of freight transported by
them, and freight owners were accustomed to receive their freight
from the platforms, the company leaving thei- freight on the
platforms during the day, for convenience of delivery, and at
night removing it into their warehouse, where it was stored without charge till called for. The plaintiffs' consignee had been accustomed to receive goods from the warehouse and platform.
The cotton was discharged from the steamer between 11 and 12
o'clock, and placed on the platform in front of defendants' warehouse, at a place where, in the usual course of business, that
kind of freight was usually deposited for delivery, at which place
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it remained in waiting until about I o'clock, when the warehouse
took fire without fault of the defendants, and the cotton was
mostly consumed.
The judge was requested by the plaintiffs' counsel to charge
the jury that "1the defendants' responsibility as carriers continued until the goods had been landed at the usual wharf, and
notice given to the consignee, and the goods had been kept safely
a sufficient time to give the consignee reasonable access to them
to examine them, and reasonable time to remove them."
The judge refused such instruction, and charged them as follows: "There is but one question in this case for you to determine. It is this. Was the cotton deposited by the defendants
upon their wharf in Hartford? A common carrier, making known
and regular transits, and having a warehouse and platforms for
the delivery of goods at the end of the transit, is discharged from
liability as a carrier on placing the goods either on such platform
or in such warehouse, for delivery to the owner or consignee, and
thenceforth is only a warehouseman. If the jury shall find that
in this case the defendants had provided a proper platform and
warehouse at the end of their route for the delivery of freight,
and in the usual course of business were accustomed to deliver
goods on such platform, storing them. in their warehouse only in
case they were not called for during the day, or within a reasonable time, then the defendants would not be liable as common
carriers for any goods safely discharged from their boat and deposited on said platform for delivery to the consignee."
The decisions of courts upon the questions involved in this case
are conflicting, and we shall not attempt to marshal them and decide upon their weight. The authorities are so divided that we
feel at liberty to decide the case upon our views of its merits, and
of the principles which ought to govern it.
The receipt given by the defendants does not attempt to specially define their duties. It simply acknowledges that the goods
are received by the boat for W. F. Willard, Agent, Hartford. It
is of course to be construed in reference to the defendants' mode
of transportation, which being by water, their duty, so far as the
carriage of the goods is concerned, is limited by that mode of'
conveyance. They are not required, as carriers by wagon under
a like receipt would be, to seek the consignee on the land and
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make delivery at his place of business. The usual course of busi.
ness of carriers by water, in general, and of the defendants in
particular, may properly be referred to in giving a construction
to the writing. The defendants made regular trips, and had their
platforms and warehouses upon a wharf of their own it Hartford, where they were accustomed to deliver, and where con
signees were accustomed to receive their goods. Up6n these facts
the defendants claimed, and the plaintiffs conceded, that the
wharf and platforms were the proper places of delivery. But,
the plaintiffs claimed, upon the fair and reasonable construction
of the receipt, in connection with the admitted facts, that, if the
consignee presents himself to receive his. goods at the proper
place and in proper time, the defendants are bound as common
carriers to deliver the goods to him, and that, in such a case, the
delivery to the consignee is a clear duty belonging to the defendants as common carriers under their contract. We think the
plaintiffs are right in this proposition, and that if the consignee
is on hand in proper time and at the proper place, there is no
room, nor any occasion, for the interposition of a warehouseman.
We are not certain that the judge's charge to the jury was
intended to apply to the case where the consignee is present and
ready to take his consignment, but his language is general, and
in terms is applicable to such a case. He says, "1a carrier making
known and regular transits, and having a warehouse and platform
for the delivery of goods at the end of the transit, is discharged
from liability as a carrier on placing such goods either on such
platform; or in such warehouse, for delivery to the owner and
consignee, and thenceforth is only a warehouseman."
This charge, as applied to a case where the consignee or his
agent is present to receive his goods, is, we think, clearly erroneous. In such case it is the duty of the defendants not only to
place the goods on the platform "for delivery," but it is their
duty to make delivery, and that duty pertains to them as carriers.
The parties have entered into only one contract, and that is a
contract by the defendants as common carrier, and the contract
cannot be changed to one of warehousemen, unless the plaintiffs,
by neglect to be present to take their goods, make the interposition of the relation of warehousemen necessary. The placing the
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goods on the platform in the manner these defendants are accustomed to do, is rather a preparatory step toward a delivery, than
in itself a delivery. The transfer of the possession and custody
of the goods to the consignee is regarded as an important part
of the duty of the carrier. During this transfer the goods are
pointed out and selected, and their condition is examined in the
presence of both parties, that it may be seen whether they have
come safely, without injury or depredation. The goods are
usually placed upon the platform for the mere convenience of the
carrier, and are there assorted and arranged by him before he is
ready to commence delivery. And, surely, until the consignee
can get his goods, they must be regarded as in the defendants'
possession as carriers.
Cases were cited by counsel to show that, in some instances.
delivery to a wharfinger or warehouseman has been held to be a
good substitute for delivery to the owner. But this is only in
cases where the owner has failed to come in due time to take the
goods himself. If he thus fails, then indeed the carrier discharges
his duty by leaving the goods with a warehouseman for the owner.
But it is only because the owner is not ready to take his property
that it may be left in a warehouse for him.
But the case in the court below does not appear to have been
tried upon the precise question thus far discussed. The plaintiffs
did not put themselves upon the ground that their carman was
actually present and waiting for the goods at the time of the fire,
but on the broader ground that he used due diligence to get his
goods, and that he was entitled to a reasonable time after their
arrival to take them away, and that the defendants remained
chargeable as common carriers until such reasonable time had
expired. And the important point still remains to be considered,
whether the plaintiffs are or are not correct in this broader claim.
We have already said that, in our judgment, the consignees are
entitled to receive their goods from the defendants as common
carriers, if they present themselves at the proper place and at the
proper time for that purpose. The point now to be considered is
what is that proper time. In order to avail themselves of their
rights in this respect, must the consignees be on hand immediately
on the arrival of the boat, and remain there constantly, without
being absent even for their meals, until their goods are ready, and
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must they then immediately take them, or is a reasonable time to
be allowed for these purposes ?
We suppose it is generally more convenient for the carrier that
there should be no rush immediately upon his arrival. We suppose it is more convenient for him that he should examine and
arrange his lading, and compare it with his bills, and place it in
order on his platform, before he commences to deliver goods to
consignees. Where the amount of freight is large, and for a
large number of persons, it is not unreasonable for the carrier to
refuse to commence the delivery until the steamer is unladen,
and the goods properly arranged for the owners. And, this being
so, it seems to us that consignees should also be allowed a reasonable time to take away their goods, so that they shall not be subjected to vexatious and irritating delays and waste of time in
waiting for their turns. It is for the interest and convenience of
both parties that the delivery should be deliberate, in order thai
mistakes may be avoided, and that the goods may be subjected to
a careful examination, that it may be known whether the carrier
has or has not carefully and properly discharged his duty in the
transportation. In cases where the carrier has no warehouse or
conveniences for keeping the goods, he may properly require that
the consignee should be quite prompt, or be visited with the consequences of a deposit in a warehouse. But where, as in this
case, the defendants have commodious warehouses and platforms,
and are doing an extensive business, consignees ought to have a
fair and reasonable opportunity to take their property, and until
they have had such opportunity and time, the goods do and ought
to remain in the care of the carrier as such. Whatever reasons
there are for imposing a strict rule of responsibility during the
transit, exist and continue in full force until the consignee has
reasonable time to take the goods into his own care and custody.
The rule adopted in Massachusetts has the merit of being definite
and of easy application, and may, in many cases, avoid a painful
controversy as to what, under the circumstances, is a reasonable
time within which the consignee must appear and take his goods.
But, on the other hand, that rule puts an end to the carrier's
responsibility as such, just where that responsibility is of the
highest value to the shipper. Between the deposit of the goods
on the platform and their delivery to the consignee, they are
exposed to theft, depredation and injury by strangers, and by the

GRAVES v. H. & N. Y. STEAMBOAT CO.

carriars' employees. In making delivery care is needed to avoid
mistakes, and attention required to see if the goods are uninjured.
During the whole process of delivery until fully completed, the
goods should remain in the care of the carrier upon the full
responsibility pertaining to him as such, and he ought not to be
allowed to lay aside that responsibility, until the owner of the
goods has had a fair and reasonable time and opportunity to
receive them.
In the case of aatliffe v. Bourne, 4 Bingham 333, the defendants, being common carriers by water, interposed a defence similar
to that made by these defendants, by way of a special plea, which
was demurred to, and in deciding the demurrer well taken Chief
Justice TINDAL says, "the next special plea contains indeed tbaverment that, after the steam-vessel had arrived in the port (if
London, the defendants were ready and willing to deliver the
goods to the plaintiff, but that he was not there ready to receive
them, whereupon the defendants landed the goods at the wharf.
But this allegation is open to the objection that it does not appear
that the plaintiff had a reasonable time or opportunity for receiving
his goods from the vessel's side. The statement in the plea is
compatible with the supposition that the steamboat arrived in the
port at midnight, and proceeded at full speed to the wharf, and
there immediately -deposited the goods; facts which, whatever
might be the readiness or willingness of the defendants to deliver,
would make it impracticable for the plaintiff to receive them, if
he had been there, and unreasonable to expect him to be there."
There are indeed particulars in which the case of Gatliffe v.
Bourne'differs somewhat from the case under our consideration.
But we think Chief Justice TINDAL expresses the true general
rule governing the duty of carriers, to wit, that they are bound
as carriers to deliver the goods to the consignee, provided the
consignee appears within a reasonable time to receive them, and
that the consignee is entitled to a fair and reasonable opportunity
to receive his goods, before the carrier can deliver them over to
himself, or to another as warehouseman.
A new trial is therefore advised.
The foregoing case determines a ques-

though the cases upon the point are not

tion of great importance in the law of
carriers, and one which, since the building of railways, has not received the

attempted to be much examined in the
opinion of the court, the principles ini
volved are very carefully set forth, and

And al-

the reasons for the conclusion adopted

same determination always.
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the court presented and weighed in s. c. 2 Riedf. Am. Railw. Cases 115,
e most careful manner; so as to ren- decides the point the same way. The
tr the decision more than ordinarily question is not free from difficulty,
aisfactory to the mind, as it seems to but the decided tendency of authority in
s. We are gratified, therefore, at the this country is that after the arrival of
,dditional weight of authority thus given the goods at their destination the owner
n the right direction, as we very early must have a reasonable time to remove
contended : 2 Redfield on Railways 77. them before the carrier's responsibility
This view is very decidedly insisted upon terminates. This view is maintained,
in the first edition of that work, in op- in addition to the cases already cited, in
position to the leading case, Norway Wood v. Crocker, 18 Wis. 345 ; Alab. 4- "
Plains v. Boston 4- Maine Railway, 1 Tenn. Railw. v. Kidd, 35 Alab. 209.
Gray 263; s. c. 2 Redf. Am. Railw. But a somewhat recent case in the Court
Cases 152 ; and the very able opinion of Exchequer, Shepherd v. Bristol 4'
of SHAW, Chief Justice, one of the ablest Exeter Railw., Law Rep. 3 Exch. 189,
jurists and judges of the present cen- . seems to regard the responsibility of the
tury. The opinion expressed by us at carrier as terminated upon the arrival
that time, with unaffected diffidence and of the goods at their destination, progreat hesitation, has since received some vided any accidental circumstance preconfirmation, besides that of the princi- vents their immediate removal "by the
pal case. The New Hampshire Court, consignee. In this case the consignee
in Moses v. Boston 4- Maine Railway, was hindered from the immediate re32 X. H. 623; s. c. 2 Redf. Am. Railw. moval of the goods on their arrival, it
Cases 65, gave a very able opinion in being Sunday, and of course unlawful.
that direction upon the very same ques- The court were divided in opinion,
tion, decided the other way by the Mas- Baron MARTIN contending for the same
sachusetts Court in the case already view here maintained. As the decision
cited, it being for a loss by the same fire was here made by two judges against
under precisely the same circumstances. one, there may be reason to expect a
The cases of Chicago S- Rock Island different result hereafter in the English
Railway Company v. Warren, 16 Ill. appellate courts. And the present tend502; Crawford v..Clark, 15 Ill. 561 ; ency of American opinion seems mainly
561 ; Gaff v. Bloomer, 9 Penn. St. 114, in the direction of the principal case,
are regarded as favoring the same view. which there is reason to expect will
I. F. R.
Blumenthal v. .Brainerd, 38 Vt. 402; continue.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
STATE,

EX REL.

SANFORD, v. MORRIS COMMON PLEAS.

The Chatham Local Option Law declared the retail of ardent spirits without
license to be unlawful, and provides that no license shall be granted if a majority
vote of the township is for "no license." Held, that the act is constitutional.
The legislature, under the power to make police regulations, may prohibit the
retail of alcoholic stimulants.
Municipal corporations and townships, or the people thereof, acting collectively,
nay be invested with authority to regulate or prohibit the retail of intoxicating
drinks.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
VAN SYCKE:,, J.-This application is made to test the constitutionality of what is termed the Chatham Local Option Law.
The provisions of the act (Laws 1871, page 1470) are substantially, that it should be lawful for the persons qualified to vote at
the next annual town meeting to determine by ballot whether
thereafter license to sell spirituous liquors should be granted;
that if it should appear that a majority of votes were cast for
" no license," it should not thereafter be lawful to grant any such
license until otherwise decided by a contrary vote at some subsequent town meeting; that from and after the passage of the act
it should not be lawful for any person within said township, with
out a license for that purpose first had, to sell by less measur,
than one gallon, and any person so selling without license shoult
be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor; and lastly, that so mucl
and such parts of all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with thiact be and are repealed.
At the time prescribed by the act, a majority of the legal voter
of said township voted "1no license." At the following May Tern
of the Morris Common Pleas, the relator by petition signed ane)
verified as by the act "1concerning inns and taverns" is required,
applied for a license to keep an inn and tavern in Chatham.
The court having refused to entertain said application, on the
ground that it bad no power to grant it, this court is asked to
send its writ of mandamus to the court below in aid of the applicant's petition.
The Local Option Law is alleged to be in conflict with that
article of our state Constitution, which provides that legislative
power shall be vested in the Senate and General Assembly. It
must be conceded that this law can have no sanction if it is a
delegation of the law-making power to the people of the township.
If the right to declare what the law shall be in one case may be
referred t.-the people, the right to do so may be given in all
cases, and thus the legislature may divest itself wholly of the
power lodged in it by the fundamental law, until by subsequent
legislation it shall be resumed. It is also obvious that it is not
competent to delegate to the people the right to say whether an
existing law shall be repealed or its operation suspended. To say
that what is now the law, shall not hereafter, or shall not for a
specified time be the-law, is in effect to declare the law to be otherVoL. XX.-3
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wise than it now is, and is a clear exercise of the law-making
power. The will of the legislature must be expressed in the form
of a law by their own act. If it is left to the contingency of a
popular vote to pronounce whether it shall take effect, it is not
the will of the law-makers, but the voice of their constituents
which moulds the rule of action. If the vote is affirmative, it is
law; if in the negative, it is not law; the vote makes or defeats
the law, and thus the people are permitted unlawfully to resume
the right of which they have divested themselves by a written con
stitution, to declare by their own direct action what shall be law.
The cases upon this subject, so far as they assert the principles
above stated, have my entire concurrence: -Parkerv. Commonwealth, 6 Barr 507; Bice v. Foster, 4 Harrington 479; .Tfaize v.
State, 4 Ind. 342; State v. Parker,26 Vermont 357; Santo v.
State, 2 Iowa 168; -aterson v. Society, &c., 4 Zab. 385.
The test will be whether this enactment, wheh it passed from
the hands of the lawgiver, had taken the form of a complete law.
It denounces as a misdemeanor the selling of liquor without
license; so far it is positive and free from any contingency. It
left to the popular vote to determine, not whether it should be
lawful to sell without license, but whether the contingency should
arise under which license might be granted. It was not submitted to the voters of Chatham to say whether there should
be a majority-vote in favor of the license before license could be
granted. The law, as framed, declares there shall be such majority-vote. The operation of the first and second sections of
the act "concerning inns and taverns," is not suspended by the
declaration of the popular will, but the act itself modifies those
sections, and makes it a condition of granting license, that there
shall be a majority-vote.
It is the law which makes the majority-vote necessary, and not
the voice of the people.
Whether the vote is ay or nay, the law at all times is the
same, and requires the majority-vote as a condition precedent to
the granting of license.
If a supplement had been passed requiring, instead of twelve
reputable freeholders, the signatures of a majority of the legal
voters of the township to the applicant's petition, would its con.
etitutionality be challenged ?
Upon principle, it makes no difference whether the recommend-
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%tion of the majority is expressed by ballot at a town-meeting.
or in the form of a certificate.
It is competent for the legislature to prescribe the mode ir
which it shall be done.
Under the general law, the applicant could not call into exercise the power of the court until twelve freeholders petitioned in
the manner therein directed. Under the special act in question,
an additional restriction is imposed, but it is imposed by the law
itself, and not by the people.
If the twelve freeholders, under the old law, do not certify,
the court is restrained from acting; if they do certify, the court
can exercise its discretion. So, if the majority do not vote for
license, the power of the court cannot be invoked; if they do
vote for license, it may. If the twelve freeholders shall not deem
it conducive to the public good, the privilege is denied; so, if the
majority shall regard it as inimical to the public welfare to permit
the retail trade, the sale must abide under the penalty denounced
by the law. The only difference is that under the special act, the
majority express their judgment as to all applications in gross,
-while, under the general law, twelve freeholders act upon them ii
detail. The fact that they vote "no license" does not make the
law one way, or that they vote "license," the other way. The
vote of the people may be changed, but the vote that a majorityvote shall be essential, remains unaltered. The legislature has
pronounced what the law shall be, and it cannot be and is not
abrogated, changed or altered by the popular expression.
The leading cases of Bice v. Foster, and Parkerv. Commonwealth, are distinguishable in principle from this.
In those cases the prohibition and penalty were not denounced
by the law itself, but by the popular vote; the selling of liquor
was not pronounced to be unlawful; it was referred to the people
to determine whether it should be restrained. So in the law proposed to be passed at the last session of our legislature, "the
offence defined by the act could not be committed, unless the
voters of the town determined that license should not be granted."
But if this is construed as an act authorizing the township, by
a majority vote, to prohibit the retail traffic in liquors, it may still
be supported. The right of the legislature to grant the power
of the local government to municipalities is conceded, and it '-
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immaterial whether the enactment conferring it is regarded as a
deolaration of the supreme legislative will, and strictly a law, or
merely as a concession of a grant by the legislature, as the representative of the sovereignty of the people.
Such legislation has become so woven into our system of government, and its exercise as an appropriate function of the lawgiver has passed so long unchallenged and has been so repeatedly
recognised by the courts, that it cannot be permitted now to be
called in question. Under the authority to establish police regulations, municipal corporations may be invested with power to make
ordinances to promote the health or contribute to the safety of
the community. Noxious trades may be restrained, the storage
of highly inflammable or dangerous materials may be prohibited.
disorderly houses may be suppressed, and sports, exhibitions and
public performances regulated, restrained or prohibited.
It would not be pretended that authority could be delegated
to the corporate body to pronounce how real estate should descend, or personal property be distributed within the city limits.
In almost every city charter the right to regulate or restrain the
sale of intoxicating liquors is expressly conferred, and it could
be done only upon the theory that it is a police regulation and
not strictly an exercise of the law-making power.
This species of property is clearly within the same rule which
permits the corporate body, under legislative sanction, to determine for itself whether gunpowder or nitro-glycerine may be
manufactured or stored within its limits. While alcholic stimulants are recognised as property, and are entitled to the protection of the law, ownership in them, is subject to such restraints as
are demanded by the highest considerations of public expediency.
Such enactments are regarded as police regulations, established
for the prevention of pauperism and crime, for the abatement of
nuisances, and the promotion of public health and safety. They
are a just restraint of an injurious use of property, which the
legislature has authority to impose, and the extent to which such
interference may be carried must rest exclusively in legislative
wisdom where it is not controlled by fundamental law.
It is a settled principle, essential to the right of self-preservation in every organized community, that however absolute may
be the owner's title to his property, he holds it under the implied
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condition "1that its use shall not work injury to the equal enjoyment and safety of others, who have an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor be injurious to the community."
Rights of property are subject to such limitations as are demanded by the common welfare of society. And it is within the
range and scope of legislative action to declare what general
regulations shall be deemed expedient. If,therefore, the legislature shall consider the retail of ardent spirits injurious to citizens or productive of idleness and vice, it may provide for its
total suppression. Such inhibition is justified only as a police
regulation, and its legality has been recognised in well-'considered
cases.
It is neither in conflict with the power of Congress over subjects
within its exclusive jurisdiction, nor with any provision of our
state constitution, nor with general fundamental principles.
(Cooley on Constitutional Limitations 583, and cases there referred to; Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 5 Howard 504.)
It is not necessary to amplify discussion on this point or to
criticise the cases in detail. The view here taken underlies the
whole subject of police regulations, and cannot logically be narrowed in its application.
An examination of the cases will show that some laws of this
character have failed to receive the approval of the courts, because they invaded the right of the citizen to be secure against
unreasonable searches, or denied to him a fair trial before condemnation of his property.
It necessarily results that municipal corporations may derive
the power to interdict the sale of intoxicating drinks, from the
same source to which they owe their authority to regulate it.
The grant of power to prohibit the sale is no more the delegation
of a right to make law, than the grant of authority to regulate it.
Assuming this proposition, how may such authority be exercised
by the corporate body?
Obviously the only limitation must be contained in the terms
of the grant itself, in the absence of any constitutional restraint.
It is wholly immaterial how the power is exercised, so long as it is
in the mode appointed by the superior.
In establishing the local government the power may, at the
discretion of the legislature, be lodged in the people to make rules
for the regulation of their internal police by their dir"'Pt vn -
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mass meeting assembled, or through designated officials by themselves duly elected. It would, therefore, be within the province
of the legislature to confer upon a city the right, by a majority
vote of its inhabitants, to pass ordinances for the regulation or
suppression of the retail trade in ardent spirits.
This leads to the question, whether Chatham township was in a
position to receive such a measure of the power of local government ?
The inhabitants of the several townships in this state are incorporated by a general law. They have, heretofore, without question, exercised many powers through a direct vote of the people.
They determine how the poor shall be kept, how much money
shall be raised for roads, and how much, if any, for school purposes, and I know of no reason why they may not be vested with
the same powers which are or could be granted to municipal corporations, including the one which gives rise to this contest. '
Whether those laws are wisely framed to subserve their purpose is not to be determined by the court, but must be referred
to that branch of our government which has the exclusive right
to enact or repeal them.
Regarding the established rule, that only in clear cases of excess should the action of the legislature be arrested by judicial
interference, I am of opinion, that the mandatory writ should be
denied.

United States Circuit Court, Basterin District of Wisconsin.
ANGELINA AMORY v. SAMUEL B. AMORY AND JOHN AMORY.
The original judgment br decree of a court having jurisdiction, cannot be disturbed in a co-ordinate tribunal, nor in a collateral action.
The decree of a state court having jurisdiction of a suit and of the parties to it,
is conclusive of the matters determined, and cannot be impeached in the courts of
the United States, nor of another state.
The Circuit Courts of the United States are not constituted to review and reverse
the proceedings and judgments of state courts. It is the duty of such courts tc
give full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings and records of state tribunals.

This was a demurrer to a bill in equity, praying that the
defendants, as executors of the last will and testament of James
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Amory, deceased, may be perpetually enjoined and restrained
from pleading, setting up, interposing or insisting upon the record
proceedings or judgment of the Superior Court of New York city,
fordivorce, in anyaction or proceeding complainant may commence
or prosecute in the court of Wisconsin, for the purpose of recovertng any portion of the real or personal estate of which James
A.mory died seised or possessed. And that the complainant may
be adjudged and decreed the lawful widow of the same James
Amory. The other facts appear sufficiently in the opinion of the
court.

F. H.
S.

illett, for complainant.

. Pinney, for defendants.

MILLER, District Judge.-The bill sets forth, that complainant
intermarried with one William A. Williams, in the year 1889, at
Portland in Maine. His occupation was that of a mariner. In
September 1841, at Boston, he shipped as second mate on board the
ship Louvre, on a voyage from Boston to the East Indies and back.
In August1842 the vessel returned to Boston, bringing intelligence
that Williams had deserted the ship at Singapore, East Indies. And
it was a common rumor, among the friends and neighbors of complainant, that Williams had shipped at Singapore on board an
English schooner, engaged in the tea trade, and he was lost in the
China Sea; which intefligence and rumor complainant charges to
be true. And since September 1841, except as above stated, she
has not been able, after great exertions, to get any intelligence of
or from Williams.
It is alleged in the bill, that in the year 1845, complainant
removed to New York, where she became acquainted with James
Amory, to whom she was lawfully married on the 12th March
1846; she continued to live with him as his lawful wife until
September 1856; and she was during all that time recognised,
received and treated as his lawful wife by him and his family and
frienis. And in that time there were various suits and proceedings in court in which she was a party with James Amory as his
wife, and she as such signed deeds and releases, &c.
They separated by their mutual consent.
The bill further states, that in July 1857, complainant commenced an action in the Superior Court of New York against
James Amory, for a divorce, on the ground of adultery. In the
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action she was represented by John D. Burchard, as her attorney
of record, until his death in the year 1860; and afterwards,
Samuel J. Glassey was substituted, who continued as her attorney
until the decree was entered.
The bill charges that, pending the proceedings in the action for
divorce, and after Glassey had been substituted as her attorney,
she applied to one Chauncey Shaffer, who was then and still is an
attorney and counseller at law, practising in the city of New York.
to retain him as her counsel in the prosecution of the action, but
he then declined so to act. That thereafter and before the making
of the order referring the cause to H. W. Robinson, the referee
appointed to try the issue and to report thereon to the court,
Shaffer sent for complainant and informed her that he had made
inquiries about her case and believed her to be a wronged woman,
and that he would take hold of, and manage, conduct and try the
same without fee or reward. Relying upon the good faith' and
the assurance of Shaffer, she did retain him as her counsel, to
conduct and try the cause, and she fully stated to him her case,
and all the facts and circumstances connected with it, and the
facts relating to her prior marriage with Williams, and his shipment and death, and the evidences of recognition of her as the
wife of Amory. Shaffer, from that time, was her sole counsel in
the management, conduct and trial of the-action, and he continued
so to act during all her litigation in respect to the same.
It is further charged in the bill, that after the decree of the
court dismissing her said action for divorce, she, confiding and
relying upon the promise of Shaffer to take and prosecute ain
appeal, and being informed by him that she was in no way
restricted or limited as to time, to take and perfect such appeal,
because no notice of the entry of the judgment had been served
upon her attorney, the appeal was delayed until on or about the
28th August 1862, when, at the instance and request of Shaffer,
acting by his advice, she retained one Oscar Frisbie, who then was
and still is a practising attorney in the city of New York, to take
the appeal. Frisbie was at the time a young man and inexperienced as a lawyer, and was retained at the instance of Shaffer,
md upon his promise to look after and take care of the appeal.
Frisbie took an appeal in August 1802, which was dismissed on
motion of the attorney of James Amory, in May 1863, on the
ground that the appeal was not taken in time, according to the
-w of the state, it appearing that notice of the entry of said
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judgment or decree was served on the said Samuel J. Glassey,
the attorney of record, on the day of the entry thereof. Complainant alleges that she was ignorant of the law, which limited
the appeal to thirty days after the service of notice of the judgment. And Glassey, although attorney of record in the action at
the time and on the day of the entry of the judgment, had taken
no part or interest in the action after the trial before the referee,
but left the case wholly in the charge of Shaffer. The notice was
served on Glassey, by leaving it at his office in his absence, and
he had no knowledge of it; complainant, by Shaffer as her
attorney, subsequently to the dismissal of the appeal, made a
motion to open the judgment in the Superior Court, which was
denied by the court, and an appeal from said order was pending
when James Amory died.
The bill then states, that James Amory departed this life in the
city of Fond du Lac, in the state of Wisconsin, on the 16th day
of August, 1868, where he was a resident and inhabitant. He
died seised of a large real and personal estate, without lawful
issue, and intestate, leaving complainant his lawful widow and
heir under the laws of Wisconsin.
It is further stated that on the 12th day of September, 1868,
an instrument of writing, purporting to be the last will and testament of said James Amory, deceased, was presented to the
County Court of Fond du Lac county, by the defendants, together with their petition, praying that a day be appointed for hearing the proofs of said last will and testament, and that notice be
.given, &c., and that letters testamentary be issued to them as
executors. The will was admitted to probate, and letters testamentaty were issued to the defendants, from which complainant
took an appeal upon the grounds alleged in the record.
On the hearing of the appeal in the Circuit Court of the county,
the defendants did interpose the judgment or decree in the divorce
suit as final and ctnclusive against her right to interfere in the
proceedings before the County Court of Fond du Lac county.
Such proceedings were had in the Circuit Court, and in the Supreme Court of this state, that the appeal from the order of the
County Court was dismissed, it having been determined in the
Supreme Court, in the absence of any trial of any of the questions of fact involved in such appeal, that the judgment in said
action for a divorce was final and conclusive as against this com-
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plainant, in respect to her interest in the subject-matter of said
appeal; and by reason thereof she is deprived of her just and
lawful right of contesting the validity and due execution of the
will; and that the same now stands as final and conclusive in law
against her in all things relating or pertaining to her rights as
said widow and heir at law in respect to the property of said
deceased.
Complainant further charges that the said
alleged will is not
in fact the last Tvill of James Amory; and that her defence to
said will, as set forth in the record of proceedings, is in all respects
true; and but fok interposing said judgment-record of the action
for divorce, she would have been able fully to prove and maintain the same.
The bill further charges that James Amory fraudulently procured said ChauAcey Shaffer to be retained and employed as the
counsel of this complainant in the action for divorce, and to take
the actual management and control of the same for her, and to
secretly and corruptly act in and control said action and the prosecution thereof, for and in the interest of said Amory, to the end
that such proceeding might be had in said action that judgment
might pass against complainant, and in consideration whereof said
Amory paid said Shaffer five hundred dollars. The bill charges
that Shaffer, in conspiring with Amory to defraud complainant,
procured himself to be employed by her as her counsel, and to conduct the action of divorce; and for the purpose of defeating her
in the action, he kept back evidence of recognition which would
have settled the matter in her favor.
It is further charged that Shaffer agreed to certain entries in
the decree against her, and prejudicial to her rights; and in the
interest of Amory he had notice of the decree left with Glassey
to her prejudice in keeping her ignorant of the decree. And
that the decree dismissing the action for divorce is void for want
of jurisdiction of the court and for fraud of Shaffer. And that
but recently, before bringing this bill, did she acquire full knowledge of the fraud practised upon her. And she is desirous of
instituting legal proceedings and actions for the recovery of the
property and estate to which she is entitled, as the widow and
heir-at-law of said James Amory, deceased.
The bill prays that defendants, as individuals, and as executors of the last will and testament of James Amory, deceased,
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may be perpetually enjoined and restrained, by order and injunction of this court, from pleading, setting up or interposing, or
Insisting upon the record and proceedings, or judgment of the
Superior Court of the city of New York for divorce, and also
of the County Court of Fond du Lac, and of the Circuit Court
and Supreme Court, in a proceeding in said courts, for the
probate of said will, in any action or proceeding complainant
may commence, prosecute or defend, for the purpose of recovering any portion or share of the real or personal estate of
which James Amory died seised or possessed. And that complainant may be adjudged and decreed to be the lawful widow of
said James Amory, and that he died without lawful issue of his
body. And that the judgments, orders and decrees of all said
courts may be adjudged to be void and of no effect. And that
the defendants, as executors, may be restrained and enjoined from
executing said will under the order admitting it to probate, or
from converting or disposing of the estate of said deceased. And
during the pendency of this suit the defendants be restrained and
enjoined from executing the will, &c.
The records of the proceedings of all the courts mentioned in
the bill are annexed as part of it, to avoid repetition.
In the record of the divorce case in New York it appears that
complainant was pressed to proceed with the suit. That a decree
was rendered on her default, dismissing the petition. On motion
and affidavits the decree was opened, on condition that they would
set down the case for trial peremptorily on a day named, and
James Amory was ordered to pay two hundred dollars to enable
her to prepare for trial. Reference was made to H. W. Robinson, by consent of the counsel of the parties. The referee took
testimony and heard the parties by their counsel on the points
submitted, and reported that the parties were not married on or
about the 12th March 1846, or at any other time. That at that
time the plaintiff was the wife of William A. Williams, and not
a single woman, nor capable of contracting a lawful -marriage;
and that Williams did not die previous to the 12th March 1846.
October 2d 1860. The cause coming on to be heard on the
report of the referee, this complainant's counsel, Glassey and
Shaffer, moved the court to open the case for further proof, which
was denied, and a final decree was rendered against her. The
record contradicts the bill in this. On the motion for further
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hearing, the record states that the affidavits of Caroline Mar..
chant and of Eliza Squires were read, and also, "that said mo..
tion to open the case for further proof be denied," while the bill
states that no such motion had been made, and no such affidavits
were read. It is charged in the bill that Shaffer corruptly added
the concluding part of the judgment, which cannot be true, as that
is the very essence of the judgment. It is also charged in the
bill that Shaffer was the only counsel of this complainant after
he became employed, while the record shows that Glassey continued to take part in the proceedings.
It is also charged in the bill that Shaffer suborned Mary
Holden, complainant's sister, to commit perjury against her as a
witness in the case
A petition was afterwards presented by this complainant to the
Superior Court of New York, praying that the judgment against
her be opened. In that petition she sets forth that she was recognised by James Amory as his wife, that she executed deeds and
releases as a party with him as his wife, that she was a party with
him in a partition suit, &c. In support of that petition the depositions of Glassey and Shaffer, her attorneys, were read, in which
they positively state that they had no knowledge of these facts.
These were facts within her knowledge, which, it appears, she had
not communicated to her counsel. In the bill she charges Shaffer
with fraud in concealing these facts from the referee. To favor
her petition to open the decree, she used the affidavit of Shaffer
of his want of knowledge of these facts, for the concealment of
which she charges him in the bill with fraud. Shaffer is also
charged with fraud in informing her that there was no limit of
time for taking an appeal, as there was no notice of the decree
served. In this he may have been mistaken, as notice of the
decree was served on Glassey at his office, who was her attorney,
of record in the divorce suit.
In my opinion it is immaterial whether the above-mentioned
facts were concealed from the referee or not. Complainant married James Amory as the widow of Williams. Amory had a right
to consider her competent to enter into the marriage relation with
him. They cohabited as husband and wife for nearly ten years,
and during that time the facts of recognition occurred, he believing her to be his lawful wife. It coming to his knowledge that
they were not lawfully married, for the reason stated, he was not
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estopped in the action for a divorce from pleading and proving
that her husband, Williams, was not dead at the date of his own
marriage with her the 12th of March 1846. She imposed on
him in marrying him before she had reasonable or legal cause of
belief of Williams's death. She married him before legal presumption of death by the expiration of seven years from the time
Wiiiiams was last heard of. And it was proven before the referee
that a letter from ,him had been recently received. She is in
fault in this respect, not James Amory. Whenever he discovered
complainant's want of legal right to become his wife, it became
his duty to repudiate the marriage with her. The Superior Court
was correct in disregarding those alleged facts in the petition to
open the judgment.
This bill is virtually an appeal to this court from the judgment
in the divorce case, and also from the orders and proceedings in
the County and Circuit Courts of Fond du Lao, and of the Supreme Court of this state; and is sought to be sustained upon
the alleged fraud of complainant's attorney, Shaffer. This court
is not constituted to review and reverse proceedings and judgments of state courts. It is our duty to give full faith and credit
to those judicial proceedings and records.
It is well understood that the courts of the United States will
not revise or correct judgments or decrees of state courts, where
the jurisdiction of those courts appears in the record. Ajudgmenl
or decree pronounced by a competent tribunal against a parts
having notice of the pendency of the suit is to be regarded b3
every other co-ordinate tribunal, and if the judgment or decree
be erroneous, the error can be corrected- only by a superior ap
pellate tribunal. The binding distinction is between judgment.
or decrees merely void, and such as are voidable only; the formei
are binding nowhere, the latter everywhere, until reversed by superior authority: Hollingsworth v. Barlow, 4 Peters 466-470
The record in the action for divorce exhibits full and .complete
jurisdiction in the courts of the state of New York, and a con.
clusive judgment or decree not void anywhere. The complainant,
by her bill and accompanying exhibits, attempts to show that
the judgment or decree of that court is voidable for fraud on the
part of her attorney. This she cannot do in this court. She
must appeal for relief to the courts of the state of New York.
It is well settled by authority and long practice, that to an ac-
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tion on a judgment record, v ul tiel record is the proper and only
plea. The plea of nil debet is demurrable: Mills v. .Duryea,
7 Cranch 481. If it is found on inspection of the record, that
the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties,
(lie judgmnent is conclusive. For fraud in obtaining the jurisdiction,
either by an unauthorized appearance of defendant by an attorney,
or Ly confession of judgment by an attorney without authority,
or by a false return to the original process, or by any fraud on
the party, relief can only be obtained in the court possessed of
the original record. The tribunal wherein an action is pending,
on representation of the facts, usually gives the party time to
make his application for relief to the original court; and upon a
certificate that the judgment is reversed or vacated, the plea of
nul tiel record becomes available. The original judgment or decree of a court having jurisdiction cannot be disturbed in a co-ordinate tribunal, or in a collateral action. It is conclusive on the
merits: Landis v. Perkins, 12 Missouri Rep. 254, 10 How. 349371; (lrognin v. Aster, 2 How. 319 ; mcPher.on v. Cunliff, 11
S. & R. 422 ; -Dunlap)
v. Stetson, 4 Mason 349; -Diggsv. Wolcott,
4 Cranch 179; Elliott v. Prescott, 1 Peters 340; MtcKeon v.
Toorlteis, 7 Cranch 24; AlfcElmoqyle v. Cohen, 13 Peters 312;
Burton v. Burgot, 10 S. & R. 240. Pleas to the country, of payment, or satisfaction, or release, or of the Statute of Limitations,
of the judgment, are allowable. Upon the same principle, the
judgments and orders of the courts of this state are conclusive in
a collateral action or proceeding: Hff v. Hutchinson, 14 How.
586; Parishv. Terris, 2 Black 606. The complainant not having prosecuted her action for divorce with proper diligence, she
cannot come to this court for relief, on the ground that an appeal
w.i pending from a discretionary order of the court denying her
pctition for a rehearing, at the time of the death of James
Amory, particularly as that order was correct and justifiable.
The court of New York adjudged that complainant was not
the wife of James Amory, consequently she cannot set up a claim
nero as his widow.
The prayer of the bill, that the defendants as executors of the
last Ivill and testament of James Amory, deceased, may be restrained and enjoined from executing the will, under the orders
of the county court admitting the same to probate, involves
direct interference on the part of this court with an exclusive and
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independent power and duty of that court. That court possesses
exclusive and independent probate powers. This court has none.
The orders of that court within its jurisdiction are as conclusive
as the judgments of this court. That court has charge of the
estate of the testator, and has the lawful power to admit the will
to probate, to issue letters testamentary, and to control the action
of the executors according to the will, who are trustees of the
legatees. All persons interested in the estate, have lawful right
to look to that court for protection. That court had jurisdiction
of the probate of the will and of issuing letters testamentary,
and this complainant appeared and had her day in that court, the
proceedings of which are sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the
state. She cannot, as a non-resident of the state, claim the jurisdiction and action of this court, upon the facts pleaded in her
bill with the exhibits annexed as part thereof, and the demurrer
must be sustained and the bill dismissed.

Supreme Court of Misourz.
WOODS v. THE ATLANTIC MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.
Where the agent of the insured, being unacquainted with the premises) signs an
application in which they are described as a "three or four story brick building,"
at the same time stating that he will send the insurers plats of the building, and
in such plats the building is stated as "first and second story of brick," the
insurers have sufficient notice to put them on inquiry, and, the third story being of
frame, cannot in case of loss claim that the policy is void in law for misrepre.
sentation of a material fact.
In a suit on such policy, whether the insurance was to be left open until the
delivery of the plats, is a question of fact and as such belongs to the jury.
Whether the buildings in all material respects were such as described in the
policy is also a question of fact, and the court had no right to give a binding
instruction to find for the insurers.
If the plaintiff makes out a case upon which he can go to the jury, the court has
no right after the defence is in, to assume it to be true, and require the jury to find
for the defendant.

THIS was an action upon a policy of insurance, in which the
question arose as to whether there had been a breach of warranty
in consequence of the misrepresentation of a material fact.
The insurance was effected through an agent, who was unacquainted vith the nature of the premise,,
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signing the application, wherein the building was described as a
three or four story brick distilling-building," stated that he did
not know if the description was correct, but he would send the
insurers plats of the building, which he did. One of these plats
had written underneath, the "first and second stories are of
brick.On the trial it was proved that the third story was of frame.
which in the opinion of several insurance agents had the effect of
greatly increasing the risk or hazard.
The court declined to permit the jury to determine if there had
been a misrepresentation of any material fact, and instructed them
to the effect that the plaintiff could not recover.
The plaintiff took a writ of error to this court, and assigned as
error the refusal of the court below to suffer the jury to pass upon
the facts.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ADAMs, J.-This was an action upon a policy of insurance
issued by the defendant to Edward P. Tesson, who originally
brought the suit, and becoming a bankrupt, it was afterwards
prosecuted in the name of the plaintiff as assignee in bankruptcy.
It was an insurance against loss by fire, on a distilling-building
and machinery. The description of the building embodied in the
policy, was, "his three or four story brick distilling-building and
machinery in the same, not running, no fire in or about, situated
entirely detached on the bank of the Iackinaw river, in the town
of Forncyville, Woodford county, Illinois, valued at $32,000."
The description in the application for insurance was substan
tially the same, with this addition, "gable end is frame."
The defence is, that the policy was avoided by breach of war.
ranty in this, that by the application and policy, Tesson warranted
that the premises insured were built of the materials stated in the
policy and application, and that they were situated entirely
letached, when in truth the warranty was false in this, that the
.Iidtillery-building was not built of brick, but that the third story
was built entirely of wood, and a portion of the distillery-building
one story high, 60 feet long and 30ifeet wide, was built entirely
.jf wood, and that the boilers for the distillery were under a shed
roof outside the wall of the distillery; and as a further defence,
,he same matter was set up as a fraudulent concealment and mis-
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representation by the insured, in not disclosing the entire description of the premises as they really existed.
The proof conduced to show that Tesson owned but one distillery, and that was the one in question; that at the time the
insurance was effected, Tesson, who was in the vicinity of the
premises, acquired the distillery by foreclosure of mortgage, and
immediately telegraphed to his agent in St. Louis to insure it;
that the agent went to the office of defendant and made known
his business, and the agent of defendant drew up the application
which the agent of Tesson signed. That Tesson's agent stated
at the time that he did not know that this description was correct,
but that he had plats of it at his office and would go and fetch
them, and if the description was inaccurate, that it might be made
perfect. That he did bring the plats, and left them with defend
ant's agent. These plats were put in evidence, and one of the
plats had written underneath, "the first and second stories are of
brick," and the evidence conduced to show that the distillery, as
a whole, stood detached from any other buildings of adjoining
proprietors; that the main part of the building was three stories
high, two stories of brick and the third story of wood; that there
were boilers set in brick outside of the buildings, covered with a
shed roof, on posts and supported against the wall, with an engine
in the cellar, and that there was a wooden addition to the main
building one story high, and some 60 feet long, and 30 feet wide,
and in connection with the distillery, and as part of it. The
defendant introduced several insurance agents who testified to the
effect, that in their opinion, the risk or hazard on the building as
it was proven to be, would be greater than on such as described
in the application and policy. Some of them also testified that
the rate of premium as charged in the policy, was ample and
sufficient for insurance on the buildings as they really existed, or
were shown to have been.
After the close of the case, the parties asked instructions presenting the issues, whether this distillery-building was the identical
subject described in the policy, or whether there was a misrepre.sentation of any material fact, or a breach of -the warranty
created by embodying the representations made in the policy
But the court refused all instructions asked, and gave an instruc.
tion to the effect that the plaintiff could not recover.
This case was before this court formerly, and is report-d . 00
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Mo. Rep., p. '6. It was then in the shape of a bill in equity to
reform the policy, on the alleged ground that there was a mistake
made in describing the premises; but the proof in the opinion of
the court failed to establish such mistake.

Judge HoL.IES, in

delivering the opinion of the court, said: "The rule, in cases of
express warranty, is that it is wholly immaterial whether the
matter warrabted were material to the risk or not; but here the
question is rather as to what is warranted. This depends partly
upon the true interpretation and proper construction of the p,'icy,
and upon the question of fact whether the buildings were in fact
in every material respect the same as they were described iii the
policy, and whether the actual warranty has been complied with
or not. It becomes essentially a question whether the facts not
literally embodied in the description in the policy, and so not
disclosed, were material to the risk ; and there can be no doubt
tLat this is a question of fact for a jury." The judgment was
reversed and the cause sent back, so that the plaintiff might proceed at law upon an amended petition, if he chose so to do.
As the record now stands before this court, the ruling above
quoted seems to be more favorable to the defendant than the facts
of this case can justify.
It seems that neither of the agents at the time the application
was made, had any definite knowledge of the exact description of
the building or the materials of which it was composed, and the
evidence also conduces to show that as part of such description,
maps were afterwards to be produced by the agent of Tesson, and
that such maps were in fact furnished. That underneath one of
the maps was written, "the first and second stories are of brick."
Now the natural inference would be, that the rest of the buildings
above the ground were of wood. This evidence also conduced to
show that the whole matter was, as it were, in fieri, or left open for
the delivery of the maps. Whether such maps were to be delivered
or shown to the agent of the defendants, were questions of fact
to be determined by a jury. If the matter was left open as indicated, till the maps were delivered or produced, then the waterial
facts not disclosed in the application and policy as written out,
were furnished, and the agent of the defendant might have
returned the premium and withdrawn the policy; but no such
offer appears in the evidence.
I am clearly of the opinion that the court erred in withdraw

